Turkey

A case history of education provision for refugees from 2011 to 2019
Turkey: A case history of education provision for refugees from 2011 to 2019

January 2021
Acknowledgements

This research study was a collaboration between Jigsaw Consult\(^1\) and Refugee Support Network\(^2\), led by Meaghan Brugha. The research team would like to acknowledge the contributions of respondents throughout this study. Their detailed, insightful, and well considered reflections regarding the provision of education during the Turkey response were invaluable and greatly appreciated. In addition, the team would like to acknowledge the continued support and dialogue with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Secretariat and UNHCR in the design and implementation of the study. This focus area is part of an ongoing global dialogue, and the research team remains grateful to be able to contribute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of UNHCR or GPE Secretariat. They are the result of independent research.

Suggested citation:


\(^1\) www.jigsawconsult.com
\(^2\) www.refugeesupportnetwork.org
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ 3
Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................ 6
Executive summary ............................................................................................................ 8
  Context .............................................................................................................................. 8
  Analysis of Theme 1: Government policy and leadership .............................................. 9
  Analysis of Theme 2: Contribution and engagement of partners .................................. 9
  Analysis of Theme 3: Humanitarian and development financing .................................. 9
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11
  1.1. Objectives of the case history .................................................................................. 11
  1.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 11
  1.3. Structure and parameters of the case history ......................................................... 11
2. Background context ....................................................................................................... 12
  2.1. Refugees in Turkey .................................................................................................. 12
  2.2. Turkey’s National Education System ..................................................................... 13
  2.3. Defining educational inclusion for refugees in Turkey .......................................... 13
3. Summary of key milestones .......................................................................................... 14
4. Government policy and leadership .............................................................................. 15
  4.1. Government policy on refugee education pre-2011 .............................................. 15
  4.2. Government ministries involved in the response ................................................... 15
  4.3. Shifts in government policy on refugee education 2011 to 2019 ....................... 16
      Phase One: Emergency education provision (2011 to 2013) .................................. 16
      Phase Two: Provision largely through separate education institutions (2013 to 2016) .17
      Phase three: Provision largely through national education institutions (2016 to 2019) .18
  4.4. Factors that triggered changes in policy ................................................................. 19
  4.5. Effects of policy and leadership on refugee education .......................................... 19
5. Contribution and engagement of partners .................................................................. 20
  5.1. Education partners involved in the response ......................................................... 20
  5.2. Government engagement with humanitarian and development partners ........... 20
  5.3. Collaboration and coordination between humanitarian and development partners.21
  5.4. Emergency and follow-up assessments .................................................................. 22
6. Humanitarian and development financing ................................................................... 22
  6.1. Financial contributions to education for refugees .................................................... 22
  6.2. Humanitarian and development funding, and the effects on education for refugees .23
  6.3. Efficiency of education provision through national institutions versus through separate institutions .................................................................................................................. 24
7. Conclusions and areas of key learning ...................................................................... 24
  7.1. Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 24
  7.2. Areas of key learning............................................................................................... 25
## Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPRM</td>
<td>United States Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTE</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfer for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAAD</td>
<td>Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>EU Department for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General of Migration Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIT</td>
<td>Facility for Refugees in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>German Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFIP</td>
<td>Law on Foreigners and International Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Family and Social Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICTES</td>
<td>Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIKTES II</td>
<td>Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Education System (PIKTES) II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Refugee Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEND</td>
<td>Special Educational Needs or Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Temporary Education Centre(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Note that the MoNE only uses the term “TEC” for the post-2014 regulated services; however, most other stakeholders use “TEC” for both periods. This report uses TEC for the post-2014 regulated services, and refers to unregulated schools as “Syrian schools”. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Student Information Processing System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YÖK</td>
<td>Turkish Council of Higher Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

This case history explores the provision of education for Syrian refugees in Turkey from the outset of the 2011 influx to the end of 2019. Findings from this study have contributed to a comparative study with Bangladesh and Rwanda, whose overarching objectives were:

- To document which factors in the early stages of a refugee response seem to determine whether refugees are included in national education systems as opposed to separate systems;
- To identify factors for further study that could shed light on essential program and policy actions that lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability of refugee education responses from the emergency stage forward.

This case history draws on:

- A review of more than 25 documents including reports, appeals, plans, academic articles, financial tables, and press releases (see Annex A for references).
- Nine interviews with relevant experts, each semi-structured and lasting an average of 60 minutes (see Annex B for an anonymized list of interviewees).
- The findings of a coding analysis exercise with data provided by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which is reported on in full in the cross-cutting report.
- The sector expertise of the research team.

There are significant knowledge gaps across the sector regarding the most appropriate way to capture lessons learned from country-specific responses to refugee inclusion in national education systems. The practical working out of this experimental methodology provides an opportunity to reflect on and improve the way in which learning is captured and shared in such contexts.

Chapters 1 to 3 of the Turkey case study provide an overview of the research objectives, methodology, background context and key education response milestones from 2011 until end-2019. Chapters 4 through 6 present findings from three key analytical themes as these influenced or impacted government and partner decisions, and actions related to refugee education:

- Government policy and leadership
- Contributions and engagement of partners
- Humanitarian and development financing

The conclusions in Chapter 7 summarize key lessons learned for education sector partners in Turkey.

Context

Turkey experienced an influx of 3.6 million Syrian refugees following the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, which made it home to the world's largest refugee population.

Prior to the 2011 crisis, school-aged refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia could access the national education system without charge by registering with their asylum seeker identity number. This was not possible for Syrian refugees during the prolonged emergency response phase from 2011-2014. Early in the response the government granted permission for temporary schools to be opened in camps, and provided curricular materials in Turkish, though no bridging or accelerated programs such as those that were offered to refugees in public education centers prior to the Syrian crisis. Without Turkish language skills, and without foreknowledge of what was to come, Syrians advocated for and were granted permission to study in Arabic with a facsimile Syrian curriculum.
Analysis of Theme 1: Government policy and leadership

There were three distinct phases in the government’s policy and approach to education for Syrian refugees. Between 2011 and 2013, the high volume of refugee influx, coupled with a broad assumption that the situation was temporary and would soon result in repatriation of the refugees overshadowed existing inclusion policy, permitted the use of parallel systems supported primarily by the humanitarian community and provided Syrians who did not have the residency permits required to register in national schools the opportunity to continue their studies. Between 2013 and 2016, the government provided increased regulation for those schools, during which time the Law on Foreigners and International Protection entered into force, paving the way for an education circular that eliminated the need for a residency permit for school enrollment. From 2016 on, evidence that the situation was becoming protracted resulted in a systematic shift toward preparations for and transition to the provision of education for Syrians, as for other refugees and foreign nationals, through national institutions.

Many factors contributed to this realignment with pre-existing policy. Among these were the need for an adapted legal framework; difficulties related to the certification of studies in parallel schools; quality assurance; social cohesion and broader sociopolitical goals of harmonization; the need for increased opportunity links between secondary and tertiary education; security issues; collaboration between the education task force and the government; advocacy for refugee inclusion in national education; incentives from the conditions attached to donor funding; increased urbanization of the refugee population; the political discourse of the time; and shifting power dynamics in the Syrian conflict. When respondents considered how policy-level decisions have affected the sustainability and relevance of the education offered to refugees, most felt that the end result addressed issues of both sustainability and relevance, although there was room for improvement within all three phases of the response.

Analysis of Theme 2: Contribution and engagement of partners

The provision of education services for refugees in Turkish public schools and temporary education centers was the result of partnership between the Turkish Ministry of National Education, UNICEF, UNHCR, donors and NGOs. The coordination and collaboration contributed to education sector planning goals through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) processes, which developed a common vision for the response.

Humanitarian and development partners engaged and collaborated throughout the response, with humanitarian partners contributing to education sector planning goals and development partners contributing to the emergency coordination mechanism. In addition, emergency response plans funded both government and partner action. Four challenges for cross-agency collaboration emerged: inconsistent information and data sharing; difficulty determining what activities “belonged” to humanitarian or development funding and work streams; institutional differences between education partner mandates; and international staff turnover and related losses to partnership building, especially with government partners.

Analysis of Theme 3: Humanitarian and development financing

Financing of the Syrian refugee education response in Turkey was not straightforward, and no global reporting tool captured all government, humanitarian and development financing, or the sequencing of that financing. The financing analysis in the body of the report attempts to capture instead findings from information available through the 3RP reporting as well as key respondent perceptions and knowledge of how the financing affected the sustainability and relevance of education for refugees.

In addition to significant resources provided by the Government of Turkey, international funding flowed to the Government of Turkey directly; first through UN agencies, and then to
the government through direct transfers or partnership agreements to facilitate program implementation; to NGOs that conducted activities on behalf of the government; and to NGOs directly or indirectly for implementation of non-formal education\textsuperscript{4} programs prior to refugee inclusion in the national education system.

As Turkey was the only country among the three cases studied that was a donor country rather than a recipient country prior to the refugee crisis, the Turkish government had few of the financial or coordination mechanisms that are common to aid-recipient countries in place. The introduction of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey coincided with acknowledgement of the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis; a shift in government policy towards the provision of education for refugees through national systems; and documented financing and support services for the educational needs of Syrian refugees.

European Union (EU) support in Turkey provides a noteworthy example of hybrid humanitarian and development financing. From as early as 2014, the EU began using development instruments for refugee services, and repositioned them to support national institutions both directly, and through UN organizations.

Respondents found it difficult to describe the transition, or trigger, between humanitarian and development financing, and 3RP reporting demonstrates the difficulty partners had in parsing education delivery elements into either the “emergency” or “resilience” categories. Respondents frequently suggested that a transition category between humanitarian and developing funding would have been helpful, though further examination of what needs would be met by an additional category of funding rather than a more effective and targeted use of emergency funding requires further examination.

\textsuperscript{4} Non-formal education is defined as education that is an institutionalized and intentional addition, alternative and/or a complement to formal education. It can be distinguished from informal learning opportunities which are less organized and structured than non-formal education and may be provided as a temporary and ad-hoc response without any integration into the wider education system (see UIS, 2011).
1. Introduction

1.1. Objectives of the case history

This case history explores the provision of education from the outset of the 2011 influx of school-aged Syrian refugees in Turkey to the end of 2019. It has two overarching objectives:

- To document which factors in the early stages of a refugee response seem to determine whether refugees are included in national education systems as opposed to being offered education in separate systems.
- To identify factors for further study that could shed light on essential program and policy actions that lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability of refugee education responses from the emergency stage forward.

Within these objectives there are three areas of specific focus: government policy and leadership; the contribution and engagement of partners; and humanitarian and development financing. Each of the focus areas is linked to a set of research questions that guided the interview structure, analysis and presentation of the data. The research questions are included in full in Annex C.

1.2. Methodology

This case history on Turkey is one of three conducted within the overall study. The two accompanying case histories focus on Bangladesh and Rwanda. Each of them follows the same methodological approach in order to facilitate comparative analysis; however, the structure of the findings is tailored to each country context.

This case history draws on:

- A review of more than 25 documents including reports, appeals, plans, academic articles, financial tables, and press releases (see Annex A for references).
- Nine interviews with relevant experts, each semi-structured and lasting an average of 60 minutes (see Annex B for an anonymized list of interviewees).
- The findings of a coding analysis exercise, with data provided by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which is reported on in full in the cross-cutting report.
- The sector expertise of the research team.

It should be noted that the methodology is experimental in both its design and its application. There are significant knowledge gaps across the sector regarding the most appropriate way to capture lessons learned from country-specific responses to refugee inclusion in national education systems. The intention is that the practical working out of the methodology provides an opportunity to reflect on and improve the way in which learning is captured and shared in such contexts. This has resulted in a set of observations focused on the way in which the methodology could be refined for future studies of a similar nature, which is presented in the cross-cutting report.

1.3. Structure and parameters of the case history

The case history begins by presenting a brief summary of the background context (Chapter 2), and an overview of key milestones regarding educational provision for refugees in Turkey from 2011 onwards (Chapter 3). This follows with three analysis sections: Government policy and leadership (Chapter 4); Contribution and engagement of partners (Chapter 5); and

---

The word ‘refugee’ is used in this case history in reference to individuals who are forcibly displaced from their country of origin, regardless of their legal status within the host country. This is in order to conduct a cross-cutting analysis and discussion of findings across the three different country responses.
Humanitarian and development financing (Chapter 6). The case history closes with key areas of learning for the sector (Chapter 7). Three annexes that provide additional information regarding the study methodology and cited resources are included.

The case history reviews insights from key actors during the Syrian refugee response from 2011 to 2019, within the analytical framework presented by the research questions in Annex C. It does not explore the experience of other refugee groups in Turkey, nor does it explore cross-border work for the Syrian crisis. Within the provision of education for Syrian refugees in Turkey it is considered that this analysis may not have captured the full nuances of the operational context, particularly as it relates to undocumented policy, partnership and financing decisions. These gaps and ways to mitigate them in future similar studies are explored in more depth in an extended methodology in Annex F of the cross-cutting report.

This case history is best read in conjunction with the associated outputs:

- Bangladesh: a case history of education provision for refugees from 2017 to 2019
- Rwanda: a case history of education provision for refugees from 2012 to 2019
- Historical mapping of education provision for refugees: a cross-cutting report

## 2. Background context

### 2.1. Refugees in Turkey

Turkey is home to the world’s largest refugee population. There are approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees who came following the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, as well as 400,000 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities (mainly Afghan, Iraqi and Iranian) currently residing in Turkey (3RP Country Chapter 2020). At the beginning of 2012, there were 9,500 Syrian refugees registered in Turkey, but by September 2014 the number of registered Syrian refugees had risen to over one million. This rapid influx continued until early 2018, when the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey surpassed 3.5 million. Figure 2.1 shows the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey over time.

**Figure 2.1: Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey 2012-2019**

![Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey from 2012 to 2019](Source: UNHCR 2020b)

Figure 2.2 presents the refugee camps, along with the number of registered refugees in each of them. As the numbers suggest, most Syrian refugees have moved outside of the camps to urban areas throughout the country.
2.2. Turkey’s National Education System

The Turkish Ministry of National Education (MoNE) assumes responsibility for the administration of the Turkish national education system. The education system is organized into formal and non-formal education. Formal education involves pre-primary, primary, secondary and higher education. The right to education is enshrined in the Turkish Constitution, and the Government of Turkey provides free primary and secondary education in public schools across Turkey. The education system in Turkey is characterized by a high degree of centralization, and is governed by MoNE, although local governments function somewhat independently (Respondent H).

2.3. Defining educational inclusion for refugees in Turkey

In the context of education for refugee children, the term “inclusion” describes the participation of refugee children in mainstream national education systems in host country contexts. It differs from the term “inclusive,” which has historically described education systems, approaches and programs that are explicitly accessible to children with special educational needs or disabilities (SEND). It also differs from “inclusive” as it has been increasingly used to refer to an approach that seeks to ensure the access, participation and learning of all children, for example in the language of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, UNESCO (1994), and Banham and Papakosta (2018).

The definition of educational inclusion for refugees in Turkey evolved along with the timeline of the response. As the policies shifted and a more integrated response was used, so too did the language around inclusion shift, and the narrative became focused on operationalizing

---

6 SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education, and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
inclusion in ways that would be appropriate to the context, rather than conceptualizing inclusion (Respondent B). According to respondents, educational inclusion for refugees in Turkey currently involves access to public schools, a curriculum offering a clear pathway for progress, and recognition of previous educational achievements and certification.

Regarding inclusion at the policy level, as part of the overall study the research team critically reviewed the findings of a coding exercise conducted by GPE on the inclusion of refugees in education sector plans. A similar methodology was applied to education documents from Turkey. Turkey does not have an education sector analysis or an education sector plan, but the Strategic Plan 2015-2019 makes specific mention of including refugees in the national system, in cooperation with international organizations. In addition, Education Vision 2023 was published in October 2018. This publication paves the way for inclusion in a development setting following from the humanitarian response, and emphasizes the need for more “evidence-based policies and programs” (World Bank 2019, p. 12). The document also mentions that “curricula will be developed for schools attended by children of migrants, foreigners under temporary protection…” (Education Vision 2023, p. 82). This coding exercise is reported on in full in Annex D of the cross-cutting report.

3. Summary of key milestones

The timeline of this case history (from 2011 to 2019) mirrors the timeline of the evolving educational response to the influx of Syrian refugees in Turkey. It tracks the transition over time, from the provision of refugee education through separate institutions before 2011, to a policy of full inclusion of the large school-age population of Syrians into the Turkish national education system. Figure 3.1 presents a visual overview of the milestones regarding the educational provision for refugees in Turkey from 2011 to 2019. Milestones include the key policy, partnership, and financing decisions and activities that emerged from the background document review and interviews with key informants. Each of these is discussed in detail in the subsequent analysis chapters.

Figure 3.1: Summary of key milestones 2011-2019

With the first arrival of Syrian refugees in April 2011, the overarching messaging of the emergency response with regard to the provision of education for refugees was one of impermanence. From 2013 to 2016 more regulation was introduced by MoNE for temporary
education centers (TECs) and other forms of informal education⁷ that provided a separate education system for refugees funded by the humanitarian community. This served as a transition to the inclusion of refugees in national education institutions, which was shaped by growing security concerns related to the proliferation of informal schools and lack of oversight from the Turkish government, as well as a realization of the long-term presence of increasing numbers of Syrian refugees. The third phase of the response, from 2016 to 2019, offers a strategy aimed at fully including all school-aged Syrians in the Turkish formal education system, shaped by the growing realization that a significant part of the Syrian population is highly likely to remain in Turkey until other solutions become available. Sensitivity around the permanence of the refugee population, however, remains, and they are expressly filed under “temporary” protection.

4. Government policy and leadership

This section presents findings regarding government policy on refugee education prior to the 2011 arrival of Syrian refugees; the government ministries involved in the response; shifts in government policy on refugee education between 2011 and 2019; the factors that triggered changes in policy; and the effects on the sustainability and relevance of the education offered to school-aged refugees in Turkey.

4.1. Government policy on refugee education pre-2011

Turkish law states that formal settlement is reserved for persons of “Turkish descent and culture” and maintains the geographical limitation on the application of the 1951 Convention to which Turkey is a signatory (Zeldin 2016). For non-European refugees, Turkey grants limited protection under one of the following temporary statuses: conditional refugee status; humanitarian residence permit; or temporary protection. With one of these three types of status, asylum seekers are permitted to stay in the country until they find a long-term place of settlement outside Turkey. Regardless of their status, school-aged refugees (coming mainly from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia prior to the Syrian crisis) could access the national education system without charge by registering with their asylum seeker identity number (Zeldin 2016).

4.2. Government ministries involved in the response

The Syrian refugee response was led by the Government of Turkey, with a UNHCR-led refugee coordination platform, which was later co-led by UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was established in 2009, predating the Syrian crisis, to provide leadership during emergencies. At the beginning of the Syrian refugee response, this leadership included establishing the refugee camps and facilitating the reception of Syrians. MoNE and a coordination unit explored various aspects of the Syrian refugee response that were involved in leading emergency-phase planning and had continued involvement in the education of Syrian refugees. While MoNE led the emergency phase planning, various directorates took leadership for different areas (Respondents B and F). Until late 2013, the response fell under the Refugee Response Plan (RRP), after which there was a transition to 3RP, with a greater focus on the resilience of

---

⁷ See footnote 4.
individuals, systems and communities (Respondent F). Within MoNE there is also a department specifically tasked with the coordination of education provision for refugees (Respondent B).

4.3. Shifts in government policy on refugee education 2011 to 2019

Phase One: Emergency education provision (2011 to 2013)

The first few years of the Syrian refugee response in Turkey was framed within a broad policy assumption that the situation was temporary and that imminent repatriation of the Syrian refugee community should be anticipated. Between 2011 and 2014, Syrians had no recognized legal status in Turkey and were referred to as “guests.” In addition, they did not have the same identification numbers as other foreigners, which prevented them from registering in national schools, although the rationale for this decision is ill-documented.

Following the first arrival of Syrian refugees in April 2011, in June 2011 MoNE granted permission for the formation of educational institutions in refugee camps (McCarthy 2018); these later became formally classified as temporary education centers (TECs) by the government in 2014. They began by teaching the Turkish curriculum; however, they were not accompanied by Turkish language learning courses and were unpopular with the refugee community (Respondent F). This emphasizes the importance of involving refugees in the response plans and ensuring their buy-in to the approach. This lack of community support, coupled with the expectation that the crisis would be short-lived, resulted in MoNE permitting Syrian children to finish the school year using the Syrian curriculum. “Syrian schools” were established by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as philanthropic and religious entities, as an organic response to this situation. Turkish municipalities also established schools for Syrian students (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2020; Respondent F). As explained by UNESCO (2018), the Syrian schools “were largely unregulated, operated outside the national system and had very limited quality assurance and standardization of certification at the end of grades 9 and 12” (p.62). These Syrian schools used a modified form of the Syrian curriculum and were staffed by volunteer Syrian teachers. Instruction was provided in Arabic which left students without the opportunity to acquire Turkish language skills. In a press release in 2012, the Minister of National Education Omer Dincer emphasized that the ministry had “no effort to teach Turkish language to Syrian children,” and there was a concern that education that provided refugee students with “Turkish skills” might deter Syrians from voluntarily repatriating sooner (McCarthy 2018).

Turkey’s pre-2011 inclusive policy on refugee education and the national education policy suggests that the provision of education for refugees through separate institutions in the early stages of the influx was an exception, likely because of the assumption was that the nature of the crisis would be short-term, as well as the significant scale of the influx. The size of the influx was dramatically different than the relatively small population of refugees Turkey had hosted prior to 2011, whose children were able to attend Turkish language classes in public education centers (that is, non-formal education institutions operated by MoNE), and then to enroll in Turkish schools (Respondent H). McCarthy (2018) similarly argues that the existence and operation of informal schools outside of the national education system is “in contradiction with the historical national education policies aiming at solidifying national unity through

---

8 Minister of National Education from 2011 to January 2013.
centralised curriculum and the emphasis on the Turkishness and Turkish language since the republican nation-building process” (p.230). The background documentation and policies reviewed for this case history supports this argument; however it has been contested by several respondents, who argue that this was not the intention in the Syrian response, and that interest in assimilation was not part of the ongoing dialogue, likely because of the significant scale of the influx.

Phase Two: Provision largely through separate education institutions (2013 to 2016)

From 2013 to 2016, the provision of education for refugees transitioned into a more regulated, but still separate system. Two notable circulars were released by MoNE in 2013, which aimed to regulate and standardize the provision of education and facilities for Syrian refugee children in and out of the camps: (i) “Measures for Syrian Guests Residing Out of the Camps” (April 26, 2013) instructed provincial education administrations to inspect the informal schools operated by civil initiatives outside of the camps, and often resulted in their closure (Respondent H); and (ii) “Education Services for Syrians Under Temporary Protection” (September 16, 2013) declared the right to education for all Syrian children under temporary protection, and aimed to regulate and standardize educational provision for Syrian refugee children. This circular also envisioned a separate curriculum to be prepared in cooperation with the Syrian National Coalition.

In April 2014, Turkey’s first domestic asylum law, the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP), entered into force. LFIP established a dedicated legal framework for asylum, and affirmed Turkey’s obligations toward all persons in need of international protection, irrespective of their country of origin (AIDA 2019). It established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), and broadly defined the educational rights of Syrian refugees. It also introduced the concept of harmonization to the Turkish legal framework, “in an effort to strengthen social inclusion, promote self-reliance and allow for host community members and foreigners including persons under temporary protection to live in harmony” (3RP Country Chapter 2020, 5). This was followed by a Temporary Protection Regulation specifically for Syrian refugees, which entered into force six months later, in October 2014. Also in October 2014, the circular titled “Education and Training Services for Foreigners” (October 23, 2014), removed the requirement to have a residency permit in order to enroll in Turkish schools, and a “foreign recognition certificate” was now sufficient for Syrian children to enroll in public schools (Zeldin 2016). This circular also laid out the framework within which TECs could operate (Akyuz et al. 2018; McCarthy 2018; Respondent F), and this was when the formal use of the terminology TEC began. TECs were required to have protocols with the provincial directorates of MoNE, and those that were not in line with the legal regulations and did not fulfil the requirements were closed (Zeldin 2016).

This shift to a more regulated approach is widely considered to be the result of the proliferation of Syrian schools, and MoNE having limited control over educational content and pedagogical approaches (Respondents B, E and H). While MoNE declared that Syrian children were allowed to attend these schools, they now also introduced regulations and set operational parameters. TECs run by NGOs and faith-based organizations had to be approved by MoNE, and they were required to have a Turkish head teacher, principal or school administrator. The aim was to eventually move all TECs into the same buildings as regular schools, and into a double-shift system. More than 100 public school buildings were allocated as double-shift schools for refugees, in six provinces: Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep,
Hatay and Kayseri. The double-shift approach was part of the separate education model; however, MoNE also invested in accelerated learning programs at the same time in order to provide Turkish language courses for refugee students, indicating a potential future transition to the provision of refugee education through national institutions. It should be noted, however, that the accelerated learning program for Syrians only came into effect in 2018.

For the secondary and tertiary levels of education, which several respondents noted are often de-prioritized during crisis responses, as part of the circular released on October 23, 2014, high school diploma equivalencies were issued to Syrians who could provide documentation of reaching an equivalent level. If they were unable to provide documentation, they were permitted to sit for a proficiency exam (Yavçan and El-Ghali 2017). For Syrians pursuing tertiary studies, the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK) created a new status for Syrian refugees so that they could register at seven universities close to the border without needing to provide original documentation in their application for study. YÖK also allowed universities to establish study programs in Arabic, and unlike other international students, Syrians were exempted from paying tuition fees. Dereli (2018) argues that this resulted in a substantial and continued increase in Syrian students enrolling in tertiary studies.

In 2015, with the requirement that Turkish language classes must be taught for at least 15 hours a week, TECs began to be seen as a stepping stone to the provision of education for Syrian refugees through national institutions. This was a substantial percentage of the teaching time, given that most TECs operated as part of a double-shift system. UNHCR supported this requirement with the procurement of over one million textbooks for learners in TECs, covering the first two levels of language proficiency (Levels A1 and A2) (Respondent F). It is considered that this move towards an inclusion approach of refugees in the national system came out of a shift in the national political discourse acknowledging that Syrians were present for longer than had been originally expected. DGMM also promoted a policy of “harmonization” (that is, greater social and cultural inclusion of refugees), which became stronger and more visible from late 2015 onwards (Respondent F).

Phase three: Provision largely through national education institutions (2016 to 2019)

Phase 3: Education via national institutions

Since 2016 there has been a growing recognition of the protracted nature of the Syrian displacement, which has resulted in an increased focus on the provision of education through national institutions. 2016 was a milestone year, during which several key policy decisions were made to include school-aged Syrian refugees in the national education system. A release from the Migration and Emergency Education Unit within MoNE in August 2016 described the intention to fully include all school-aged Syrian refugees in the formal national education system (UNESCO 2018). The closure of TECs began in the 2016-17 school year as part of a phased process whereby new enrollments in Grades 1, 5 and 9 were stopped; and this was progressively extended to other grades year by year (World Bank 2019; Respondent H). In 2016 MoNE also started to provide educational services through a program titled “Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System” (PICTES), which aimed to support the delivery of education to Syrian and Turkish learners through MoNE’s own systems. This continued the previous education that had been provided, and expanded it to include early childhood education, and technical and vocational education and training (TVET). In addition, since October 2016, 5,200 Turkish language teachers have been recruited and trained, and 1,800 school principals have received training in the inclusion of Syrian students
into the school system (European Commission 2017).

Turkey continues to host the largest refugee population in the world. In 2019, the number of Syrians registered under temporary protection was more than 3.57 million. More than 680,000 Syrian school-aged refugees are enrolled in formal education, and more than 33,000 Syrian students are attending institutions of tertiary education (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2020). Continued challenges include enrollment rates and attendance, however, as there are a large number of school-aged refugees across the country out-of-school (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2020). The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) program seeks to address this through the provision of small funds for school attendance. This program⁹ is implemented by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (MFSP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and MoNE; it also ensures that the protection needs of enrolled children are identified and addressed (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2020; Respondents A, B and F). This is of course a short-term solution, and should therefore be implemented along with longer-term and sustainable strategies for increasing school enrollment and attendance.

Examples of additional efforts by education sector partners for the inclusion of refugees, as laid out in the 3RP Turkey Country Chapter (2020), include seeking to increase the number of Syrian students studying at Turkish universities through the provision of intensive Turkish language learning courses; removing course fees; the provision of a monthly cash stipend; and the introduction of a scholarship program for higher education. In addition, education partners implemented a large adult language education program in conjunction with MoNE’s General Directorate of Life Long Learning, to address the problem of language as a key obstacle for refugee access to the labor market.

4.4. Factors that triggered changes in policy

There was no consensus across the interviews, nor was there any background documentation regarding the policy trajectory to allow the research team to confidently ascertain which factors led to education policies evolving in the way they did. Several respondents considered it likely that this was a gradual evolution, with a number of interconnected factors at play, including: (i) Difficulties related to certification; (ii) A need for quality assurance of instruction, particularly with the proliferation of Syrian schools, over which MoNE had limited control regarding the educational content and pedagogical approaches; (iii) Issues regarding social cohesion and the broader socio-political goals of harmonization, which highlight a noteworthy relationship between education and the inclusion of Syrians in Turkish society; (iv) Increased links between secondary and tertiary education; (v) Security vulnerabilities in the initially flexible system; (vi) The close working relationship between the task force and the government; (vii) Advocacy on the part of agencies for the provision of education for refugees through national institutions; (viii) Incentives from the conditions attached to donor funding. (ix) Movement of refugees from camps to urban areas. (x) Factors from the broader political economy, the political discourse of the time, and shifting power dynamics in the Syrian conflict; and (xi) The significant increase in the numbers of refugees, and recognition of the protracted nature of the crisis. As one respondent articulated: "We realised the war was continuing and we needed permanent solutions for educational provision“ (Respondent G).

4.5. Effects of policy and leadership on refugee education

When respondents considered how policy-level decisions affected the sustainability and relevance of the education offered to refugees, most felt that the end result addressed both sustainability and relevance, although there was room for improvement within all three phases of the response. Respondents did not question the validity of the TECs, but when

---

⁹ According to the CCTE program, students attending both public schools and TECs receive payments every two months, amounting to 35-60 TL per month, depending on their gender and grade, in addition to a one-time payment of 100 TL for each child per semester (3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2020).
relevance and sustainability was considered for TECs specifically, it was proposed that they should have been conceptualized from the beginning as a transitionary step, from the emergency provision of education through separate institutions toward provision through national institutions. This could have promoted Turkish language acquisition from earlier on, which could have also enhanced enrollment numbers. Respondents also noted that it would have been useful to have conversations regarding language learning and accelerated learning from the beginning of the response so that a streamlined continuum of educational opportunities could be offered to refugees. This type of early preparedness also extends to having early policy-level conversations about the likelihood of the long-term stay of refugees, how best to support them, and the implications for host communities to manage any arising tensions early and in dialogue with key sector actors and refugees themselves.

The last area, regarding social cohesion, is considered as the biggest cost of not offering refugees access to national institutions at the outset of the crisis. Research shows that Turkey’s welcoming approach to refugees appeared to be unpopular among Turkish citizens living in provinces with high Syrian populations (Erdoğan 2014), which in turn led to problems with social cohesion. There have also been recent challenges in classrooms, such as bullying and discrimination, and the inexperience of teachers in dealing with non-Turkish-speaking refugee children and the management of multicultural classrooms. This could have been mitigated through teaching training and other social adaptation programs involving school administrators, teachers, students and parents (Erdoğan 2014).

5. Contribution and engagement of partners

This section presents an overview of the education partners involved in the emergency response; findings regarding government engagement with humanitarian and development partners; the collaboration and coordination between humanitarian and development partners; and the emergency assessments that were conducted.

5.1. Education partners involved in the response

The provision of education services for refugees in Turkish public schools and TECs is the result of a partnership between Turkey’s MoNE, UNICEF, UNHCR and other donors. There was no formal cluster system coordinating the humanitarian and development education partners; however, there was sector coordination via an education working group established under the 3RP coordination framework. This group was chaired by the Government of Turkey and UNICEF (Respondents B, F and H). MoNE led the educational response from the outset of the crisis, with UNICEF providing core technical and financial support. This included technical assistance for the registration and monitoring of Syrian students in MoNE’s database (the Foreign Student Information Processing System, or “YOBIS”); contributing resources for the construction of TECs; and providing Syrian volunteer teachers in TECs with financial incentives and training. UNHCR provided support for the teaching of the Turkish language in TECs, and supported access to higher education (Respondents B and F).

5.2. Government engagement with humanitarian and development partners

The Syrian response was led in full by the Government of Turkey from the outset of the crisis. The role of local and international NGOs was more prominent at the beginning of the response, but they were met with a narrower operational space after 2016, at which point more regulations were introduced concerning what they could do and how they could operate (Respondents B, F and H). NGOs run by Syrians who were able to get Turkish paperwork found operational space in Turkey; however, many NGOs did not receive the required approvals, so many of their educational activities were stopped (for example, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children). For a while
there were only a few running programs by civil society actors (3RP Country Chapter, 2020; Respondents F and H). This caused tensions between NGOs, the Government of Turkey and other education partners. It is noteworthy, however, that the increasing difficulty for NGOs to operate did provide opportunities for UN agencies to be more involved from 2014 onward. This included working closely with MoNE to assist in the organization of the response through managing TECs and recognizing volunteers, as well as assisting in the development of YOBIS, the database for the collection of Syrian refugee information and data.\textsuperscript{10} The rationale for this preference is not explored in this case history, although this is an important area that needs further consideration, including the degree to which it is helpful to have NGOs providing educational opportunities for refugees in the host country, and if so, at which phase.

While tensions existed between the Government of Turkey and NGOs, partnerships between MoNE, multilateral international agencies and other donors were considered successful overall. Government engagement with these humanitarian and development partners contributed to education sector planning goals through the 3RP processes, which developed a common vision for the response. This meant that financing could then contribute to common outputs among education partners and stakeholders (Respondent F). One critical success factor cited by respondents regarding engagement between MoNE and its partners was a pre-existing relationship with agencies where there were past processes of collaboration to call upon. Challenges regarding these partnerships included building relationships with government officials, who are frequently moved due to ministerial changes, and a general lack of coordination among all stakeholders (Respondents A, C, H and G). This lack of coordination was particularly felt from 2011 to 2013, during which time most services were led by emergency institutions through large NGOs, with very little large-scale, organized delivery of services because the crisis was at that time considered to be short-term.

5.3. Collaboration and coordination between humanitarian and development partners

Humanitarian and development partners were both closely involved with the response, but several respondents noted that sector-based coordination only really got off the ground toward the end of 2014. This coordination structure for the education response was led by MoNE and supported by UNICEF and UNHCR; however, it did not include non-UN entities. By 2016, this group no longer met, and the coordination structure shifted to the subnational level, without a national equivalent (Respondent F). Respondents reflected that the operation of the working group could have seen improvements. Despite a strong desire from partners to bring streams of work and specialists together from all sectors to engage in a meaningful dialogue, most respondents felt that this did not happen and various tensions appeared to exist that may have inhibited the response.

Four challenges for cross-agency collaboration emerged in conversation with respondents: (i) A lack of information and data sharing (Respondents A, B, F and H). This is perceived to have been injurious to the response, and to the ability of agencies to provide relevant and sustainable education and support. This lack of information sharing did not only exist between agencies and NGOs, but also between the government and humanitarian and development actors. This may have been because of the tenuous legal status of some NGOs, which would have therefore been cautious about sharing operational documentation for fear of putting their work further at risk (Respondent H). (ii) There were also challenges associated with allocating activities in either the humanitarian or the development stream. (iii) Respondents, as well as the literature have pointed to ideological differences between agencies, in addition to disproportionate amounts in the funding they were responsible for. For example, UNICEF was responsible for much more funding than UNHCR. Additional research should be conducted regarding the implications of a UN entity with a particular approach to the response having a

\textsuperscript{10} Note that YOBIS was only available to MoNE.
high level of funding. (iv) There was a level of uncertainty among staff from international organizations. Many respondents explained that even the staff themselves did not know how long they would be posted, which makes long-term planning and relationship-building more complicated. The temporary nature of their positions, and the implications for the response requires further exploration.

5.4. Emergency and follow-up assessments

The way that humanitarian and development partners coordinate and collaborate may also impact the type of emergency, and the type of follow-up assessments that are conducted, as well as whether they collect equivalent information for host community students. UNICEF and UNHCR assisted MoNE in the development of YOBIS. Respondents emphasized that one area of the response that needs to be strengthened, however, is the use of assessments, and the collection of large-scale, robust qualitative data on out-of-school children for feeding into educational planning. This was perhaps compounded by the fact that NGOs were not allowed to collect data, as this was seen as a Government of Turkey mandate (Respondent F). UNICEF has continued its support for MoNE in migrating the data from YOBIS into that of national schools, and importantly, is supporting the analysis of this data. This is particularly critical when exploring qualitative reasons for why children are out of school in Turkey in order to feed the results into planning.

6. Humanitarian and development financing

This section presents an overview of financial contributions to education for refugees during the response period; findings related to the humanitarian and development funding response; and the associated implications for refugee education. It closes with a brief overview of the efficiency of education provision through national institutions versus through separate institutions.

6.1. Financial contributions to education for refugees

Turkey offers a complicated context regarding financing, and the relationship between financing with broader policy and leadership responses is more complex than this section intends to provide an analysis of. The focus is rather on broader considerations from respondents regarding how the financing of the response affected the sustainability and relevance of education for refugees; this section does not seek to provide a complete overview of the dispersion of funds. This is in part because of a lack of clear documentation, but also because the funding flows in Turkey were not straightforward. Funding flowed: (i) to the Government of Turkey directly (for example, through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey bilateral funding); (ii) through UN agencies and then to the government, through direct transfers or partnership agreements to facilitate program implementation; (iii) to NGOs that conducted activities on behalf of the government; and/or (iv) to NGOs to implement non-formal education programs (Respondent F). Respondents felt that it was often unclear where the funding that was channelled through the EU and other countries was originally from. In addition, having NGOs report on their funding was challenging in this particular context, although this is also a recognizable challenge in the sector more widely. A further complication in this context is that Turkey does not usually position itself as an aid recipient, but rather as a donor country. Because of this, it sits somewhat outside of the analytical framework used for the methodology. However, when the protracted crisis resulted in funding and capacity limitations around 2015, international assistance was necessary. Thereafter there has been a consistent call for the financial response to the crisis to be a more international one (Respondents F and H). This has created some notable issues: for example, the government not being well equipped to coordinate with UN agencies or donors and their funding because they had not received much overseas development aid prior to the Syria crisis, particularly for education.
Several respondents commented on the significant amount of funding that the Government of Turkey provided for the response. In addition to government resources, financing for education programs was provided by a wide range of donors: for example, the German government; donors who made contributions to UNHCR that were not earmarked for specific uses; the United States through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), among others (Respondent F). The EU is presented in this section as a noteworthy case study in providing a hybrid financing mechanism between humanitarian and development financing, since the funding evolved alongside the timeline of the response. Financial support from the EU began initially with emergency financing through European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and then transitioned into medium and longer-term support in response to the protracted nature of the crisis. From as early as 2014, the EU began using development instruments and repositioning them to support national institutions, both directly and through UN organizations. For example, the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funding\(^\text{11}\) was redirected to support the Syria response, and there were several education projects approved under IPA as early as 2014, that were not viewed as humanitarian funding (Respondent F).

In January 2016, the EU released 3 billion euros through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) program. FRIT offered a blend of different funding streams and put together money from ECHO, the EU Department for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and EU trust funds for the Syria response. It also included money underspent on other instruments, which were repositioned for FRIT (Respondent F). Of this money, over more than 650 million euros was dedicated to education services, including Turkish language programs, academic support and financial incentives. FRIT also financed activities from other international agencies and NGOs including for the purpose of supporting the construction of schools. Direct funding of 300 million euros from FRIT was provided to MoNE for PICTES (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey 2017). UNESCO (2018) provides a breakdown of PICTES: “two-fifths financed school construction and the rest was allocated to Turkish and Arabic language courses, catch-up education and remedial classes, free school transport, education materials, an examination system, guidance and counseling, training of 15,000 teachers and hiring of administrative personnel” (p.62). This financing milestone is viewed as particularly significant because it shows responsibility sharing and solidarity, and its timing coincides with a wider recognition of the protracted situation of Syrian refugees, as well as a move toward the provision of education through national institutions.

FRIT and PICTES were introduced as the response transitioned to the provision of refugee education through national institutions, although it remains unclear exactly how this shift and the financing are related. It is noteworthy, however, that in March 2016, an agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey to return “irregular migrants.” Part of this agreement was the guarantee to “further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under FRIT”, along with a promise that once the initial resources are about to be used in full, the EU would mobilize up to an additional 3 billion euros to the end of 2018, as dictated in the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.

6.2. Humanitarian and development funding, and the effects on education for refugees

The transition from humanitarian to development financing remains unclear in terms of what triggered the development financing; respondents described the gap between funding streams difficult to fully clarify. Respondents also recognized an overall need to have a transition category between humanitarian and developing funding. Indeed, even within organizations and agencies it remains challenging to know when the transition to development financing is best placed because “it is a continuum of response and is not compartmentalized”\(^\text{11}\).

\(^{11}\) The Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funding is usually provided to assist countries to strengthen systems to meet EU regulatory standards (Respondent F).
The financing led to specific documented support services for the provision of education for refugees. To use FRIT as a case study, the first tranche of FRIT funding was from 2016 to 2017, and documentation indicates that it financed work by a range of organizations: for example, the CCTE project, Concern Worldwide, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Federation of Red Cross Societies, Turkey’s MoNE, the German Development Bank (KfW), the World Bank, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Stichting SPARK and UNHCR, among others. EU FRIT financing continued from 2018 to 2019 in a second phase, providing UNICEF, KfW and MoNE with additional funding to conduct a continuation of the CCTE project, build and equip new schools in provinces with a high concentration of Syrian refugees and continue activities from the previous direct grant for Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Education System (PIKTES) II. While it is difficult to accurately ascertain the effects and the impact of the financing on the inclusion of refugees in the national education system specifically, the timing of PICTES I / PIKTES II does align with the move toward the provision of education through national institutions.

It was widely acknowledged that multiyear funding is needed in order to plan sustainable responses and the effective provision of education (Respondents B, C, E and G). There are challenges associated with receiving short-term contracts and financing, such as uncertainty around the length of the intervention, difficulty planning, and staff in many cases not knowing how long they will be in the country. This results in poor project sustainability and loss of the ability to track outcomes and impacts. This exists along with the questions of who should be funded directly, what impact such decisions can have and how they relate to the relationship between the host government and its humanitarian and development partners.

The 3RP offers another notable case study, since it sought to be a nexus-funding instrument, with some funding supporting humanitarian activities and others more focused on development objectives (Respondent F). However, while tracking of the 3RP indicates that there was an increase in resilience funding, as noted in section 5.3 above regarding the humanitarian-development nexus, it was often challenging to clearly allocate activities to either the humanitarian or the development stream.

6.3. Efficiency of education provision through national institutions versus through separate institutions

It was widely considered that the provision of education for refugees through national institutions is more efficient when compared with provision through separate institutions; however, this needs to be packaged more clearly and accessibly in order to be helpful in conversations with government decision makers at the outset of refugee responses. For example, it is not clear that the provision of PICTES I/PIKTES II financing, and the ensuing policy shifts moving toward the inclusion of Syrian refugees in the national education system was the result of analyses of efficiency.

7. Conclusions and areas of key learning

7.1. Conclusions

This case history explores the provision of education from the outset of the 2011 influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey in order to: (i) Document the factors in the early stages of a refugee response that seem to determine whether refugees are included in national education systems as opposed to being accommodated in separate systems; and (ii) Identify factors for further study that could shed light on essential program and policy actions that lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability of refugee education responses from the emergency stage.
forward.

Eleven factors emerged as supporting the inclusion of refugees in the national education system throughout the stages of the Syrian response: (i) Difficulties related to the certification of Syrian schools; (ii) The need for quality assurance of Syrian schools; (iii) Issues regarding social cohesion, and the broader sociopolitical goals of harmonization; (iv) Increased links between secondary and tertiary education; (v) Security vulnerabilities associated with the initially flexible system; (vi) The close working relationship between the task force and the government; (vii) Advocacy on the part of agencies for the inclusion of refugees in the national education system; (viii) Incentives from the conditions attached to donor funding; (ix) The movement of refugees from camps to urban areas; (x) Factors from the broader political economy, the political discourse of the time and shifting power dynamics in the Syrian conflict; (xi) The significant increase in the numbers of refugees, and recognition of the protracted nature of the crisis.

The factors requiring further study that could shed light on the essential program and policy actions that lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability of refugee education responses, include: (i) Successes in simultaneously building the capacity of a system to respond to refugee needs (for example, retention and progression), and also ensuring that immediate needs are met; (ii) A more nuanced understanding of how the pre-crisis environment affected the emergency phase; (iii) The role of host-country language acquisition in enabling or inhibiting inclusion, and how this affects and is accompanied by maintenance of the mother tongue; (iii) Why, despite the available data about the longitudinal nature of resettlement trends, there is often a political position arguing for the short-term nature of crises; (iv) Why Syrian refugees had no recognized legal status in Turkey from 2011-2014, and why they were referred to as “guests;” (also, why they did not have the same identification numbers as other foreigners, which prevented them from registering in national schools); (v) The rationale behind the operational limitations of NGOs in Turkey for providing education; the degree to which it is helpful to have NGOs provide educational opportunities for refugees in the host country; and if it is, at which phase; (vi) Finally, further research should incorporate the government’s perspective in more detail than was possible for this study, particularly for a strongly government-led response, as was the case in Turkey. A limitation of the current study was the inability to interview more government officials, or any members of the EU delegation to incorporate their voices and insights. Linked to this, further research should have a focus on the programming of local organizations, how learning was mobilized between them, and how this affected the relevance and sustainability of education for refugees.

7.2. Areas of key learning

The response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey presents a number of additional important lessons learned for the sector regarding key successes and challenges in the provision of education for refugees. These are summarized below.

**Governments are increasingly at the center of refugee responses.** Turkey serves as an important case study in a government-led response. Respondents reflected that governments are increasingly at the center of responses to crises. Humanitarian and development actors need to consider the ways in which they can coordinate to support governments in strengthening systems while providing education for refugees.

**Early preparedness is needed in order to challenge the reflex of the sector.** Respondents stated that the reflex of the sector is to respond to crises in an *ad hoc* manner, and noted that at the beginning of the response it felt like no one was functioning like development actors, as the interventions were aimed at an emergency response in an emergency context, especially considering the lack of legal protection for the Syrian refugees. (Respondent H). Early policy-level conversations should be had about the likelihood that the refugees’ stay will be long-term; how to best support them; and the implications for host communities, in the interest of managing any tensions early on.
Refugees should be meaningfully involved in the education response. This was particularly emphasized through the lack of success in the initial educational institutions that were established in refugee camps, which offered education in the Turkish curriculum, but without Turkish language courses. These were unpopular with the refugee community; however, it did lead to the establishment of numerous informal schools as an organic response.

Host-country language acquisition is perceived as an incentive for refugees not to voluntarily repatriate. The provision of Turkish language skills experienced its own evolution throughout the response that echoed the timeline of refugee education more broadly. The response began with no provision of Turkish language skills for Syrian refugees; transitioned into offering Turkish language classes through TECs; and in phase 3 a more structured and substantial series of classes proficiency was offered, in recognition that the lack of Turkish language proficiency was a major barrier to enrollment in and completion of education, and access to the labor market.

Programs of education for refugees offered through separate institutions are often expensive to set up, administer and maintain and are often not accredited. If this policy is selected there needs to be careful consideration; risk analyses made of the impact of this approach on the future livelihoods of the refugee population; and a clear justification for the decision that is mobilized to key actors as a reference point.

An evidence base is needed to explore the implications of the inclusion of refugees in national systems in further detail. Drawing on the learning from Turkey is critical in order to add to the evidence base for the sector more widely. In learning from Turkey, it is necessary to consider the refugee education through separate institutions that was provided in the initial phases of the Syrian refugee response, and the effectiveness and efficiency of refugee inclusion in the national education system in the third phase of the response. Linked to this, there needs to be a more effective way of capturing learning for the sector. There is a lack of documentation of decisions made, and the rationale behind them.

The cross-cutting report presents key learning from each of the three country contexts in additional detail, as well as sectoral recommendations and areas for further research.
Annex A: References


Annex B List of Interviewees

- 6 interviews with staff of UN agencies
- 2 interviews with government representatives
- 1 interview with staff from an INGO
## Annex C: Research questions

### Research area 1: Government policy and leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary and secondary research questions</th>
<th>RQ1a: How have different governments addressed the issue of whether and how to include refugees in national education systems?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What was the national policy on inclusion of refugees prior to the crisis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To what degree did ministries involved in national education sector planning lead emergency-phase planning? If they did not lead it, to what degree were they involved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Was there any shift in government policy toward educational assistance for refugees and their access to the national education system during the course of the crisis? If so, what factors triggered such change? Did any particular factors incentivize/disincentivize such a change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ1b: What can be said about how these approaches have affected the sustainability and relevance of the education offer for refugees?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Research area 2: Contribution and engagement of partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary and secondary research questions</th>
<th>RQ2a: How was the response influenced by governments’ engagement with humanitarian and development partners?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To what extent are education partners split along the lines of development and humanitarian response, and how do these links (or lack thereof) support or hamper an integrated, longer-term approach for refugee education?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What can be said about actions and measures undertaken by development actors during emergency phases in the three cases that have supported or hampered the transition of refugees to national systems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How did development partners (including an education sector planning body) engage with humanitarian education actors during the crisis? Did development actors take part in / contribute to: (i) an emergency coordination mechanism established for the crisis; (ii) emergency assessments; (iii) developing the education chapter of the emergency and/or refugee response plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Did emergency assessments collect equivalent information for host community students?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Did emergency response plans fund government or partner action, or both?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To what degree did humanitarian partner action contribute to education sector planning goals as articulated in ESPs or equivalent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ2b: How did this engagement support or hamper an integrated, longer-term approach for refugee education?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What can be said about actions and measures undertaken by humanitarian actors during emergency phases in the three cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that have supported or hampered the transition of refugees to national systems?

**Research area 3: Development and humanitarian financing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary and secondary research questions</th>
<th>RQ3a: How was the refugee education response affected by humanitarian and development financing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What proportion of the joint humanitarian funding response contributed to programmes that supported refugee inclusion, either through direct support to public systems or learning support that led to inclusion (e.g. national accelerated education programmes)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is it possible to accurately estimate the international financial contribution to education for refugees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ In Rwanda, for responses since the Kigeme response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ In Turkey, prior to and following the decision to include Syrian learners in the national system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ In Bangladesh, since 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What impediments, if any, exist to gathering accurate estimations of international humanitarian and development financial contributions to education for refugees in each context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What data is needed to determine whether integrated programs for refugees are more efficient than parallel responses?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>